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COMMENTARY ON BOSHKOFF, SOME GLOOMY
THOUGHTS CONCERNING CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCIES
IAN F. FLETCHER*
Although Professor Boshkoff himself strives to characterize his paper'
as an essay in pessimism, it may be remarked that in this instance (as in so
many others) the fruits of long experience suggest that caution and
skepticism are essential qualities of mind with which to approach the
phenomenon of cross-border insolvency and the multiple problems
generated thereby. Pessimism may thus be acknowledged as closely akin
to realism for the current purpose. Indeed, it would if anything be a gross
understatement to claim that the age-old problems of international
bankruptcy are among the most intractable to have presented themselves to
scholars and practitioners searching for workable and just solutions to the
legal complexities of our increasingly interdependent global community.
Nevertheless, it behooves us not to be defeatists even in the face of such
daunting challenges to our collective intellectual skills. And in § 304 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,2 we certainly encounter much that is positive
and potentially liberating in the quest for improved interjurisdictional
cooperation in bankruptcy matters. The section has undoubtedly set a new
benchmark in terms of judicial empowerment, through its authorization of
the U.S. court to respond directly to applications lodged by foreign
representatives (as opposed to foreign courts alone), and without any
specific precondition that there should be international agreements in force,
to which the United States and the foreign state are parties, pursuant to
which such cooperation may take place. Neither of these qualities is to be
found, for example, in the latest statutory provision enacted in the United
Kingdom, namely section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The latter
provision operates exclusively on the basis of judicially formulated requests
for the rendering of assistance, submitted by courts of countries scheduled
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1. Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border hIsolvencies, 72
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2 See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988).
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nominatin for this purpose on the basis of established arrangements
between the United Kingdom and the other state or territory. The historic
absence of such arrangements between the United States and the United
Kingdom necessarily entails that, for the time being, the otherwise flexible
statutory powers of the U.K. courts to grant judicial assistance in bankrupt-
cy matters are precluded from being exercised for the benefit of any trustee
or other representative appointed in U.S. bankruptcy proceedings.
Nevertheless, the foregoing does not mean that the incumbent representa-
tive in a U.S.-based proceeding cannot look to the courts of the United
Kingdom for appropriate and essential assistance. The foundations for such
assistance, established by case precedents, are well developed historically,
and there is no basis for supposing that those common law precedents have
been disturbed or supplanted by the modem statutory provision in the Act
of 1986, referred to above.3 Therefore, to the extent that, as suggested by
Boshkoff, the U.S. courts, when responding to requests for assistance
brought under § 304, will wish to verify the substance and reality of the
foreign system in terms of its readiness and capability to accommodate the
interests of parties in the United States on the instant (and on some
hypothetical future) occasion, the credentials of the United Kingdom seem
perfectly sound, at least in theory. In practice, however, much odium and
suspicion as to the true character of the English bankruptcy law in its
relationship with that of the United States has been generated by the
courteous, but firm, refusal by Justice Hirst, in his judgment in Felixstowe
Dock and Railway Co., Ltd. v. U.S. Lines, Inc.,4 to lift an injunction
preventing turnover of the English assets of a U.S. corporation undergoing
Chapter 11 reorganization. Although this decision was widely interpreted
as signalling a policy of noncooperation towards this form of U.S.
proceeding, if not towards others, the reality is arguably less sinister and
less generalized. Justice Hirst was careful to point out the detrimental
implications of the reorganization plan, viewed from the perspective of the
English creditors, when compared with the prospective, longer-term
implications for the U.S. creditors of the debtor company. Since a
comparable solicitude for protection of the interests of U.S. creditors is
3. For the English case law concerning cross-border insolvencies and the various forms of
assistance available to foreign trustees, liquidators, etc., see ALBERT V. DICEY & J.H.L. MORRIS, DIcEY
AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 30-31 (12th ed. 1993); IAN F. FLETCHER, TIlE LAW OF
INSOLVENCY ch. 27-29 (Ist ed. 1990).
4. [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76; [1989] QB 360. This case is referred to by Boshkoff in his paper
at footnote 38. Boshkoff, supra note 1, at 939 n.38.
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manifested in the terms of § 304(c) itself when foreign proceedings are in
progress and the request for turnover is made in the opposite direction, it
is perhaps not too unreasonable for a foreign judge to reserve the discretion
to review the substance of the prospective consequences of turnover from
the standpoint of local parties in interest, and to afford them a degree of
protection against prejudice or inconvenience or unjust treatment, so far as
it lies within his power to do so.
Since the decision in Felixstowe Dock, there have been indications of a
discreet, but determined, judicial initiative aimed at correcting the negative
transatlantic conclusions derived from that case. The ghost may have been
finally buried, in well-publicized circumstances, by the series of comple-
mentary decisions reached during various episodes of the Maxwell
insolvency saga, which commenced shortly after the death at sea of Robert
Maxwell in November 1991, and is still in progress. One early harbinger
of a fresh spirit of internationalism in judicial collaboration was the
innovative fusion of U.K. Administration proceedings with U.S. Chapter 11
proceedings, sanctioned by orders emanating from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York and the U.K. Chancery
Division, to facilitate the transatlantic coordination of the insolvency of
Maxwell Communications Corporation PLC (MCC), the English-formed
parent company of the publicly owned companies within the Maxwell
"empire." By this means, the English administrators of MCC were able to
acquire the status of the corporate governors of the company in the eyes of
U.S. law, and consequently to function as the "debtor in possession" for the
purposes of Chapter 11.
Taking advantage of their dual status under the insolvency laws of both
jurisdictions, the administrators later resolved to embark upon preference
avoidance proceedings in New York with respect to a transaction utilizing
funds derived from the disposal of a U.S. asset of MCC, which allegedly
amounted to a wrongful preference of a creditor in England. There are
significant differences between the U.S. and U.K. laws on preference attack
indicating that the administrators would have more favorable prospects of
recovery using U.S. law in a U.S. court. Not surprisingly, the creditor
sought to deny them this advantage by seeking an anti-suit injunction from
the English court. Both the First Instance judge (Justice Hoffman) and the
Court of Appeal refused to grant an injunction, and seemingly went out of
their way to emphasize that it would be an arrogant and offensive exercise
of judicial power for the English courts to preempt the prerogative of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court to rule upon the preliminary issues of its own
jurisdictional competence, and of the appropriateness of bringing proceed-
1994]
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ings there.5
There were simultaneous proceedings, this time anchored purely in
English law, involving the administration of the private-side companies
belonging to the Maxwell empire. The administrator in one of these sets
of proceedings wished to procure the stay of a New York court action
against the company-Headington Investments Ltd.-of which he was the
administrator. Accordingly, he sought relief by requesting, pursuant to
§ 304, that the Bankruptcy Court enjoin the continuation of that action.
Whether by accident or by design, the judgment of Judge Brozman in In
re Brierley6 was delivered within seven days after the First Instance
decision of Justice Hoffmann not to grant an anti-suit injunction in the
MCC proceedings.7 Although the two sets of proceedings were not
directly linked, a common spirit seems to infuse both judgments, and in her
opinion Judge Brozman places on the record the positive benefits that have
resulted therefrom. At the same time, a more general appraisal of the
nature and quality of English insolvency law is offered, including its
Administration procedure, from the standpoint of U.S. standards of
evaluation utilized under § 304. In her conclusion that the Insolvency Act
1986 is "manifestly not" repugnant to American laws, which followed
closely upon an intensively reasoned judicial plea in favor of the principle
of comity as a resource with which to counter the "potential for chaos" that
is "lurking in all international bankruptcies,"8 the learned judge eloquently
demonstrated that, for the present at least, peace has broken out along the
transatlantic corridor. Long may it endure!
5. Barclays Bank PLC v. Homan (Re Maxwell Communications Corp. PLC), [1993] BCC 757
(Hoffmann, J.); BCC 767 (Court of Appeal). It is intriguing to note that in her subsequent decision,
dated August 5, 1994, Judge Brozman concluded that it was inappropriate for the Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York to accept jurisdiction to hear the preference avoidance suit, having
concluded that English law should govern the matter and that the English court was the appropriate
forum.
6. 145 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
7. The judgments were delivered on July 28, 1993 and August 4, 1992, respectively.
8. 145 B.R. at 164.
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